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WEAPONS AGAINST UNEMPLOYMENT AND INFLATION
Why Not Miiiimlze the Social Costs?
Walter W. Hdlahon
Unemployment continues to hit hardest those least
eqtilpped to bear adversity: unskilled laborers, racial
minorities, and the poor. At the same time a slowing but
stubborn inflation continues to upset household budgets,
especially for those who need medical care and new housing
or who depend on public transportation.
In its efforts to achieve economic stabilization, the
administration has devoted more energy to the fight against
Inflation then to the more recent fight against unemployment.
It has carried on its attack against inflation by curtailing
demand, a policy that tends to benefit a different group of
people from those who suffer the income loss of unemployment.
Yet an attack against unemployment is tantamotint to a direct
attack against many of our social problems: urban and rural
poverty, criae, growing welfare rolls. It is noteworthy that it
costs only a little more to employ idle workers than it does
to maintain them and their fa'ailies. Furthermore, unemployment
which these days hovers juct bslo:-? 6%, does not hit all groups
equally; it is currently about 11% for construction workers, about
17% for teenagers, about 9.5% for blacks, and about 30% for black
teenagers. Reducing unsTrployjinnt would reduce quickly the number of
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areas designated as "depressed" — currently about fifty. It
would also contribute to longer-run grovjth by encouraging
investment in new technology. If, instead of relying entirely on
curtailing demand, a more comprehensive wage-price or price-incomes
policy were used to help restrain any continuing inflation, we
could reduce both unemployment and the cost of living squeeze.
(Such a policy, incidentally, might also help reduce labor un-
rest, which threatens to result in a steel strike in August.)
The management of the economy is of course fundamental to the
public interest. It is also fundamental to President Nixon's
reelection prospects and to the composition of the next Congress.
The Nixon Aiministration attacked inflation with such vigor that
it has since found it necessary to counteract the resulting
effect by announcing a "full employment budget" designed to
stimulate economic activity. Yet tightening of fiscal and monetary
policies in 1969 was clearly necessary, for no administration
committed to a balanced stabilization policy can allow infla-
tion to run unchecked at rates in excess of 5-7%. But inflation
was curbed at a price, and it is reasonable to ask if the same or
better results could not have been achieved at less cost.
In its February Economic Report the Administration announced
that it plans to allow enough slack to remain in the economy
throughout 1971 to maintain continuous downward pressure on the
rate of inflation. Administration economists, who are aware of the
lag between the time a policy is started and the time its effects
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are felt, plan to have the economy return to full employment
"by mld-1972," just in time for elections. Plans for improving
conditions in the construction industry were announced, but it
is also important to consider other weapons that could be used
as part of a price-incomes policy to restrain the more important
remaining sources of inflation. The need for a sensible wage-
price policy is not a temporary one, for creeping inflation can be
expected to remain a problem as long as the economy is kept close
to full employment levels. But the social cost of maintaining a
pool of 5^-6% unemployed, as was done throughout the 1958-1963
period, is just too high a price to pay as a continuing restraint
on a modest inflation.
The Trade Off Between Unemployment and Inflation
The policy choices open to President Nixon and his key
economic advisors are most easily understood by reference to a
modified Phillips curve. This curve plots the rate of consumer
price increases on one axis and the rate of unemployment on the
other, showing that increases in unemployment reflecting slack
demand tend to be accompanied by reductions in inflation. A
similar trade off between unemployment and inflation has been found
to exist in northern European countries. If refinements are
introduced to allow for the effect on wage rates of lagged price
increases, labor productivity or profit rate changes, and labor
"reserves" (workers who leave the labor force as unemployment
Increases), it is a permanently useful tool for interpreting
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economlc stabilization policies.
Notice the relatively stable prices throughout 1960-1965
appearing low on the curve in Figure 1. This stability was upset
by President Johnson who financed the escalation of the Vietnam
x^ar with borroxd.ng rather than with taxes, thereby increasing
total demand. Since the economy x^as already near production
capacity and full employment in 1965, excess demand x^/as created,
and prices rose throughout 1966-68, as shoxm to the left along
the curve.
Momentum carried the economy upward in the first half of
1969. But President Nixon switched the federal budget to a huge
$13.4 billion surplus by raid-year and encouraged the most intensive
squeeze on credit in the history of the Federal Reserve System.
Together these fiscal and monetary policies stopped the upsx^ing,
with the upper turning point of industrial production coming early
in September 1969.
Then the economy started dovmward and unemployment rose.
But even though it is well known that the main effect of interest
rates in discouraging construction appears only after a lag of
six to nine months, monetary policy permitted long term interest
••Strictly speaking, product prices are influenced by demand
pull (e.g. unfilled orders, operating capacity limits, the "gap"
between potential and actual output), and by cost push factors
(e.g. wage costs, profit, raw material prices, and labor productivity).
The adjustment period is short; 3-6 months as estimated bj'
Eckstein and Fromm. With wage rates influenced by the factors
listed in. the text as developed by Perry, Simler, Telia, and
others, the wage equation may be substituted into the price
equation to obtain the "reduced form" explanation of prices in the
modified Phillips curve.
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rates to rise on into 1970. As would be expected, the unemploy-
ment rate in the construction industry climbed, reaching 12.7%
by September 1970.
The trough of the recession was reached in November 1970,
when real gross national product and the industrial production
indices were at their low points. Overall unemployment reached its
high of 6.2% in December. This groxjing unemployment was stopped
by an earlier easing of fiscal policy leading to a $14 billion
Federal deficit by June 1970. The budget deficit occurred largely
because of an increase in unemployment compensation passed by
Congress, an automatic increase in unemployment payments as
unemployment grew (together a $9 billion increase) , expiration of
the remaining 5% Vietnam war surtax (a $3.5 billion tax decrease),
and some automatic reductions in federal income tax receipts as
income fell. All of these expenditure increases and tax cuts put
purchasing power in the hands of consumers . The increased purchasing
power reversed the decline in effective demand within three to six
months and contributed heavily to the upturn of the economy in
December. Budget deficits are much misunderstood, but they are
absolutely vital in filling in the troughs of economic activity,
2Evidence consistent with a lag of 3 to 6 months before the
effect of changes in fiscal policy are felt is offered by
simulation tests of the Brookings econometric model of the United
States economy. The tests found that first round effects of fiscal
policies of this type were completed within three months and that
three-fourths of the total multiplied effects were completed
within six months.
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for they leave tax dollars in the hands of consumers and
reverse declining demand.
Consumer Price Increases
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Figure 1 Trade-Off of Inflation vs Unemployment
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Monetary policy also changed in the summer of 1970, allowing
long term interest rates to decrease a little. It has been
estimated that the "decision lag" between the time interest rates
are changed by action of the Federal Reserve Board and the time
business men decide to invest is very short, generally less than
three months. But there is a much longer production lag before
plant or residential construction is put in place and workers and
material suppliers paid. In fact it is two and a half years
before all the effects of a decrease in interest rates are felt,
with about half the effect completed in nine months. Nevertheless,
this decrease has been reflected in an increase in housing starts,
which began in December 1970 consistent with the lag before the
first noticeable effects occur that has been estimated to be
six to nine months. An increase in other forms of new construction
began in January 1971; these are both increases in real investment
that can be expected to continue. In fact the enormous pent up
demand for new housing could lead to a significant increase in
housing starts in early 1972 because long term interest rates
continue downward right now from 8%% toward 6% in many cities.
Unfortunately, the steady upward movement of construction
costs tends to choke off this demand for new housing. It remains
to be seen how effective President Nixon's attempts to do something
about the restrictive practices of some of the A.F. of L. craft
unions and the troublesome markup practices of lumber yards
(price increases of 42% just since December 1970) will be. But
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the recovery of the construction industry, not to speak of the
welfare of the continuing pool of less skilled and black unemployed
construction workers, depends heavily on his success.
In general, then, the administration's effort to prevent
first runaway inflation and then massive unemployment has been
successful, although we have almost come to take such stabilization
for granted. The success of overall stabilization policies, based
admittedly on an uneven application of improved economic knowledge,
in at least six northern European countries and the United States
3
in the postwar period has been striking. There has in fact been
no serious depression or currency breakdo\TO in any of these nations
since World War II. President Nixon accepted whole-heartedly the
principle of a full employment budget in his January Budget Message .
Expenditure is to balance with revenue as projected at full employ-
ment; this means an actual budget deficit for the new fiscal year
following on the $18% billion for the current fiscal year ending
June 30, 1971. Therefore stabilization policy can be expected to
take care of the upper and lower ends of the Phillips curve in
Figure 1 — that is, runaway inflation and massive unemplojrment —
permitting attention to be turned to solving the problems that
remain when unemployment is betx/een 3.9 and 4.5 per cent.
3
See Bent Hansen, Fiscal Policy in Seven Countries
, Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development, Paris, 1969, pp. 69-73.
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A Price-Incomes Policy ?
Wage-price guideposts were used in the 1962-1967 period.
After that, apart from some ineffective jawboning and some talk
about all out controls which nobody wants, this approach was
dropped. Now, however, the Council of Economic Advisors reports
immediately to the Cabinet Committee on Economic Policy any
exceptionally inflationary wage and price developments, so that
the Cabinet Committee can consider appropriate Federal action.
The next step should be to articulate a coherent price-incomes
policy and subject it to public discussion. Perhaps a few suggestions
can be made here about a price-incomes policy that would help
improve the trade off between unemployment and inflation, there-
by minimizing unemployment and contributing to the achievement of
a sustainable real growth of 4^2% a year.
From the 1962-1967 experience it was learned that wage-
price policies work only as a supplement to general fiscal and
monetary stabilization policies designed to stabilize demand.
When, for example, there is excess demand, as there was in 1967-
1968, it is unrealistic to expect workers to limit voluntarily
their increases in wages to a fixed rate tied to productivity
increases (usually about 3.2% a year) and firms not to raise their
prices unless there is all out rationing. And at the other
extreme when there is considerable unemployment, if it is after a
period of rising consumer prices, increases in wages mean that at
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first workers' real incomes are catching up to the cost of living.
But if the slack persists, the guidelines are redundant. A price-
incomes policy therefore should probably be used only when the
economy is in the middle range of the Phillips curve, as it is
now, with unemployment ranging from 3.9 to 6.5 per cent.
A price incomes policy can certainly work to alleviate
bottlenecks by increasing supply. One example is medical care.
There is an acute need for more doctors, especially general practi-
tioners, pediatricians, and internists. Above all, there is an
acute need for more doctors in rural areas and urban ghettoes. At
the same time medical care prices have risen considerably more
rapidly than any other major item in the consumer price index. They
stand at 170 on a 1957-1959 base of 100, compared to 133 for food
and 160 for construction. Part of this may be due to the fact that
doctors, rather than the public, control the policies of the Blue .
Shield plan and of many hospitals, and part may be due to the
lower rates of growth of productivity that Professor Baumol and
others have suggested may be typical of many service industries. In
any case, from the point of view of the national interest, President
Nixon's veto of the doctor training bill is absolutely incomprehen-
sible. For even with government help, it takes a long time to
train doctors.
An approach to a price-incomes policy that is appropriate
for non-service industries is to satisfy excess demand by selling
government stockpiles and easing import restrictions. In the
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steel industry, for example, the possibility of easing import
quotas V7as explored by President Nixon. After very large price
increases were announced in January 1971, President Nixon,
probably as a trial balloon, directed his Cabinet Committee on
Economic Policy to reexamine tha agreement with Japanese and EEC
steel producers that limits their sales of steel in the United
States. Since increased steel imports would change the competitive
situation, U.S. Steel adoptsd a somewhat smaller price increase.
This is important, because U.S. Steel's prices act as a benchmark
for the rest of the industry. Furthermore the size of the
January price incraace nay influence the policy of the United
Steelworkers Union. Had the increases been smaller, the union
might have moderated its demands when its contract comes up for
negotiation this su'^aaier.
Finally, a price-incomes policy is concerned with the economy-
wide wage-price escalation, not just \ri.th conditions in a few
industries. The process goos Gorething like this. Prices depend
primarily on total deaai'd, on changes in v/ages and profit rates,
and on rates of incrccre in productivity per man hour. If high
demand should mo^^s some prices upward, households will not sit
idly by and watch thci:.- real incoaes deteriorate. There will be
pressure for higher wages and salaiies, and after a lag these wage
rates will be subject to cor.t of living adjustments. Business firms
pass these wage increases along to consumers in the form of a
second round of prlca increases, often with a little additional
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margin for themselves. This encourages another round of wage
Increases , which by this time can have become considerably greater
than the increase in productivity. Workers see themselves as
regaining lost ground or in Professor Friedman's terms, adjusting
4
to inflationary expectations. If there is unemployment and
slack demand, new "safety margins" cannot be built in on each
round, and the escalation process must thus slow dox^m.
Some kind of reasonable price and wage criteria that define
what is excessive in relation to increases in productivity can
help to damp this wage-price escalation. Most research indicates
that the guideposts, used during the period 1962-1967, did have
some effect; Canada is currently having some success with a wage-
price policy; and most of the major European countries have used
price-incomes policies of different kinds for some time. Of
course, there is a change in the distribution of real income
in favor of entrepreneurs during the period of excess demand
,
followed by a reduction in profits as labor negotiates cost of
living adjustments and catches up, but this is a dynamic effect
that any policy must take into account.
The formation of a National Commission on Productivity is
certainly a step in the right direction, for increases in productivity
will move the modified Phillips curve to the left. Notice the 1970
^Professor Milton Friedman and others might prefer to
Interpret the lagged price term, which is prominent in most research
on Phillips wage equations, as also measuring the state of infla-
tionary expectations.
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observation in Figure 1, a year during which productivity grew at
only 1% and this, combined with 1969 's price increases, held the
Phillips curve to the right. Then notice the 1971 objective,
based on an increase in productivity closer to the more normal
rate of 3.2%, Increasing productivity means that for any given
rate of price increases, there need be less unemployment. The
Commission should be assigned the task of developing appropriate
norms for non-inflationary price and wage behavior. But since its
responsibility is broader than this, the final responsibility for
a price-incomes policy should rest with the Council of Economic
Advisors
.
Opportunities for Increasing Productivity
Important opportunities for maintaining high rates of
growth in productivity lie in the recognition that investment in
human capital contributes to productivity and long run growth.
There are other well-known ways of increasing productivity: for
example, avoiding recessions, which underutilize plant capacity
and white collar vrorkers, and lead to low investment in new
technology; reducing tariffs; reducing by anti-trust action the
barriers to entry into industries; and organizing firms and
industries more efficiently. But awareness of the opportunities
that exist to increase productivity by investing in human resources
is new. Economic research is now flourishing on the connection
between investment in education, on-the-job training, health,
prisoner rehabilitation, and job mobility to productivity in later
I
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life. Such investment increases productivity not just in terms of
physical output but also in terms of the quality of human life.
Sweden offers an example of a country that through its
various social welfare programs has had a very high rate of
public investment in human resources accompanied by a vigorous
policy of encouraging job mobility. The Swedish economy has
been at full employment throughout most of the postwar years,
with prices rising at 4% as compared to 1 3/4% in the United
States, and a faster 4.9% rate of real economic growth.^ This
faster growth may be partly the result of Sweden's investment in
human resources, which allows people to become more productive
and encourages more effective utilization of their skills.
Defense Cuts?
The cost of the v;ar in southeast Asia has been estimated
at $30 billion a year. There is evidence that expenditures on
non-defense public goods are normally curtailed and domestic
needs deferred during wars. But it has also been shown that
these needs are typically met when the war ends , and many have
hoped that the withdrawal from Vietnam would release funds to
meet these needs. Yet the budget for fiscal 1972 provides for a
remarkably steady outlay compared to fiscal 1971 for military
operation and maintenance ($20 billion), military personnel ($20
billion plus $2.4 billion for pay raises), and procurement
($17.9). The defense budget, which reached a peak of $80 billion
5see Fiscal Policy for a Balanced Economy , OECD, December 1968,
edited by JCR Dow, pages 80 and 105.
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in fiscal 1970, was cut temporarily by $4 billion in fiscal 1971,
and is now budgeted to return to $77.5 billion in the new fiscal
year. This cut, together with the dropping of the SST, led
to some temporary unemployment in the west coast aerospace indus-
try. But the expiration of the surtax on June 30, 1970 left enough
purchasing power in consumers' hands to more than compensate for
the defense cut. Purchasing pov/er xi^ill also be increased by
the increase in the standard income tax deduction from $600 to
$625 and by the additional 5% tax cut scheduled for 1972 that was
part of the tax reform measure passed by Congress in 1969.
Thus, the decrease in spending on the war is being offset partly
by tax cuts and is being shifted partly to other defense purposes.
So the Vietnam withdrawl is not responsible for the overall level
of unemployment, but also at the moment it is hot directly
available to help meet long deferred non-defense needs.
Nor does the Administration plan to finance these non-
defense needs — domestic education, welfare reform, health care,
crime prevention, improvement of environmental quality — by
increasing the percentage of GNP spent on social programs.
The budget projections through 1975 shov? public expenditures on
non-defense needs remaining at approximately their current 29%
of GNP, a smaller percentage than occurs in any of the major
northern European countries.
Instead, budget increases for public expenditures are to be
financed by an $11.6 billion deficit in fiscal 1972 and by the
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projected growth in the economy. But the budget uses a very
optimistic projection for growth, showing the GNP at $1,065
billion in 1972, whereas most economists predict it vrill be about
$1,050 billion. (The first quarter GNP is $1,018 billion, and
about $1,030 billion would have been needed to reach $1,065
billion for the year.) The higher forecast is based on a model
constructed by Art Laffer, an economist in the Office of Manage-
ment and the Budget. His model rests on the debatable assumptions
that the overall impact of changes in budget policy washes out to
zero after the first quarter and that the impact from changes
in the quantity of money on consumer and investment spending is
instantaneous. Such a model is unlikely to be acceptable to
Arthur Burns, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, or to many
other professional economists. But it does fit in i^^ith a certain
amount of administration wishful thinking. If the forecast is
not attained, the deficits planned for fiscal 1971 and 1972 will
be larger than expected.
Further defense cuts, therefore, should not be expected
to cause unemployment. Instead they may make it possible to
satisfy some of the unmet needs for medical care, education, and
other social programs.
A Balancing Act
Given the state of economic knowledge there is no reason
the economy cannot be close to full emplo3mient and to its potential
for real growth without inflation. There is no reason the
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economic impact of Vietnam cannot be phased out smoothly.
The Administration has quite properly applied tight
monetary and fiscal policies to control inflation. But it has
failed to use supplementary programs to ease troublesome bottle-
necks and it lacks a comprehensive price-incomes policy that would
include efforts to increase productivity. It also kept long
term interest rates high well past the inflationary peak,
maintaining excess slack in the construction industry.
The "mid-course correction" scheduled by the Administra-
tion this sumner needs to consider the relation between investment
in both new physical equipment and human resources and economic
growth. Federal expenditure is not inflationary vrhen the economy
is as far away from full employment as it currently is, particu-
larly if further demands are not made on a few bottlenecked
sectors. The repeated curtailment of HEVJ expenditure, especially
when there are important opportunities to raise productivity
through applied research and to develop human resources among
the unemployed, appears somewhat short sighted.
It will take a balancing act to return to full employment
and to near potential growth immediately without inflation.
But the means are available. It would be unfortunate to have
to pay the social cost of maintaining a continuing pool of
unemployment together with more inflation than is necessary until
mid-1972.
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